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lN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN rrHE MATTER OF: 
THE ESTATE OF THOMAS 
FAIRCLOUGH PIERPONT, 
Deceased, 
TRACY-COLLINS TRUST 
COMPANY and 
VILATE P. DEVINE, 
Appellants, 
-vs.-
MARGUERITE GESSFORD 
PIERPONT and 
ELLA P. MEYER, 
Respondents. 
Case 
No. 9022 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
I. THE TIME OF VESTING OF THE RESIDUAL 
ESTATE IN THE TRUSTEE AND THE EFFECTIVE 
DATE OF THE TRUST PROVISIONS ARE CON-
TROLLED BY THE TESTATOR'S INTENTION, NOT 
BY STATUTORY OR CASE AUTHORITY. 
A basic issue involved here is the time when title to 
the trust property vested in Tracy-Collins Trust Com-
pany as Trustee and the time when the trust provisions 
of the will became effective. 
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Appellants ur~e that this question must be answered 
from an interpretation of the will and that under the 
will provisions analyzed at pages 13-18 of Appellants' 
Brief, the residual estate vested in the Trustee, both in 
title and possession, on distribution from the Executor 
and the trust provisions became effective only then. 
01). the other hand, Respondents argue that the 
answer lies in an application of §74-2-25, U. C. A. 1953 
and certain cited case authorities which, they assert, 
caused title to the residual estate to vest in the Trustee 
at the Testator's death. The essential difference in these 
contentions is shown by the following quotation from 
page 9 of Respondent Meyer's Brief: 
''Counsel * * * argues in brief the intention of 
the testator. We will stick with the law and show 
that the cases throughout the land are against 
Appellants' position and will confirm this court 
in affirming the lower court.'' 
The leading case cited by Respondents to support 
their argument is In re Platt's Estate (California), 21 
Cal. 2d 323, 121 P. 2d 825. Of the Platt case Respondent, 
Pierpont, states at page 14 of her brief: 
"In re Platt's Estate cited supra deals with 
nearly all of the problems concerned in this Pier-
pont will and appeal and this case follows the 
rule of the Restatement §234 Trusts also cited 
above. Platt holds that the trust yests at the 
testator's death." 
Respondent, Meyer, quotes at length from this case at 
pages 12 to 14 of her brief and at page 11 states: 
''So here we have the whole case in a nutshell, 
decided in the highest court in California, over-
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ruling an erroneous line of prior authority, with 
a rationale that must be followed here because 
our statutes are the same, and the logic is iden-
tical • * *" (Emphasis added) 
In fact, the California and Utah statutes governing 
the time of vesting of Testator's estates are very dis-
similar. Because of this difference, the Pla.tt case and 
other similar California cases are not controlling or even 
persuasive here, except as an application of their reason-
ing leads to the result contended for by Appellants. 
Section 28 of the California Probate Code is identical 
with §74-2-25, U. C. A. 1953, and provides that testa-
mentary dispositions are presumed to vest at the Tes-
tator's death. However, this presumption can be over-
come by the Testator's expressed intention that title 
vests at a later time. (See In re Lowe's Estate, 68 
Utah 49, 249 Pac. 128 where this court held, in interpret-
ing §6371, Compiled Laws 1917, which is identical with 
said §74-2-25, U. C. A. 1953, that title to the decedent's 
estate vested at death under the will involved there 
because there was "nothing in the will to indicate an 
intention on the part of the testatrix that the vesting 
of the bequests and devises made therein should be 
postponed beyond her death.'') 
However, in California there is an additional statu-
tory provision governing the vesting of decedents estates 
not found in the Utah Code which accounts for the un-
qualified statement in the Platt and other similar cases 
that testamentary dispositions vest at the testator's 
death. Section 300 of the California Probate Code pro-
vides: 
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"When a person dies, the title to his property, 
real and personal, passes to the person to whom 
it is devised or bequeathed by his last will, or, in 
the absence of such disposition, to the persons 
who succeed to his estate as provided in division 
II of this code ; but all of his property shall be 
subject to the possession of the executor or ad-
ministrator and to the control of the superior 
court for the purposes of administration, sale or 
other disposition under the provisions of division 
III of this code, and shall be chargeable with the 
expenses of administering his estate, and the 
payment of his debts and the allowances to the 
family, except as otherwise provided in this code. 
Thus, under the California statutes, title to a testator's 
property vests in the will beneficiaries at the testa-
tor's death despite the provisions of the will. 
Starting from the premise that the residual estate 
vested in the trustee at the testator's death subject to 
the executor's possession and control during probate, the 
court in the Platt case concluded that payments from the 
trust accrued from that date. It said: 
"Unquestionably the rule of the restatement is 
based upon sound reasoning. As title to all testa-
mentary dispositions vests at the testator's death 
* * * the title of the trustee to Mr. Platt's prop-
erty vested as of that date even though the trust 
estate v;as residuary in character.'' 
In In re Hyland's Esta.te, 58 Cal. App. 2d 556, 137 
P. :2d 273, 275, the California court commented as fol-
lows on the Platt case: 
''The opinion of the Supreme Court points out 
that under tl1e la-w of this state the title under a 
testamentary disposition vests as of the date of 
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death of the testator, that as a result the trustee's 
title and that of the beneficiary vest as of that 
date, and concludes that the life tenant is there-
fore entitled to income from that date as an inci-
dent of that title." (Emphasis added.) 
Under this reasoning a delay in the vesting of title 
would inevitably lead to a corresponding delay in the 
commencement of payments from a trust created by will. 
The lower court in this case said in its minute entry 
of September 24, 1958 : 
''An examination of the cases and the restate-
ment of the Law of Trusts appears to support 
the view expressed in the prior ruling of the 
Court." (R. p. 463.) 
It is evident that both the lower court and Respon-
dents are ignorant of the important difference in the 
California and Utah statutes and have erroneously 
assumed that title to the trust estate vested in the Trustee 
at the Testator's death, notwithstanding the express pro-
visions of the will to the contrary. Likewise, they have 
failed to comprehend that the reasoning supporting the 
California cases and the rule of the Restatement was 
based upon this assumed vesting of title in the trustee 
at testator's death and that if, in fact, title vested in 
the trustee at a later time, the commencement of pay-
ments from the trust logically would be deferred until 
then. Thus, an application of the reasoning of the Cali-
fornia cases and the Restatement here necessarily lead 
to the result contended for by Appellants, since the Pier-
pont will clearly provides that title to the residual estate 
would vest in the Trustee at the time of distribution. 
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In re Dare's Estate, 196 Cal. 29, 35 ; 235 Pac. 725; 
In re Hyland's Estate, 58 Cal. A.pp. 2d 556; 137 P. 2d 
73, 75; In re Schiffman's Estate, 86 Cal. App. 2d 638; 
195 P. 2d 484, 488; and In re Hill's Estate, 149 Cal. App. 
2d 779; 309 P. 2d 39, cited by Respondent, Pierpont, at 
pages 13 and 14 of her brief are inapplicable here be-
cause they either cited and followed the Platt case or 
involved will provisions essentially the same as those in 
the Platt case. 
Lightenberg v. Burdell, 101 Cal. App. 20, 281 Pac. 
518 and Western Pacific Railway v. Godfrey, 36 Pac. 284, 
cited by Respondent, Meyer, at page 19 of her brief, 
correctly state the California rule that the estate of a 
decedent vests in his devisees and legatees immediately 
upon his death but, of course, have no applicability in 
Utah. 
Eldredge v. Eldredge, 9 Cushing (Mass.) 516; In re 
Gaffer's Estate, 5 N.Y. S~ 2d 671; Parkhurst v. Gi'YIIn, 117 
N. E. 202 (Mass.); In re Will of S.C. Leitsch, 201 N. W. 
284 (Wis.), 37 A. L. R. 547; State Ba;nk of Chicago v. 
Gross, 344 Ill. 512; 176 N. E. 739; 75 A. L. R. 172; 
Caughy v. State Deposit & Trust Co., 196 l\Id. 252; 76 A. 
2d 323, cited in one or the other of Respondents' briefs, 
are not controlling, or eYen persuasive here. The will 
provisions involved in those cases are far different from 
the will provisions in question here. Almost without ex-
ception, those cases make the statement that the first 
duty of the court was to ascertain and give effect to the 
intention expressed in the testator's will. Similarly, 
interpretation of the Pierpont ·will is the chief duty of 
the eourt here. 
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II. IN THE INTERVAL BETWEEN TESTATOR'S 
DEATH AND FINAL DISTRIBUTION, TITLE TO 
THE RESIDUAL ESTATE WAS VESTED IN 
TRACY-COLLINS TRUST COMPANY AS EXECU-
TOR OF THE ESTATE. 
As Respondent, Meyer, correctly points out at page 
20 of her brief, at common-law title to personal property 
of a testator vested in the executor upon its appoint-
ment. Some jurisdictions, like California, altered this 
common-law rule to provide that at death both real and 
personal property descend directly to the beneficiary 
with a qualified right of possession in the personal rep-
resentative for the purpose of administering the estate. 
In such jurisdictions the executor functions in a manner 
similar to a receiver in that possession but not title is 
in the executor and it lacks the power of disposal except 
by court order. 
However, Utah has not wholly abolished this com-
mon-law rule. Our statute only raises the presumption 
that title to a testator's personal property descends di-
rectly to the beneficiaries which, of course, is controlled 
by the testator's intention. 
Since the Pierpont will expressly provides that the 
residual estate would vest in the Trustee only after the 
estate had been probated and since the residual estate 
consisted wholly of personal property, title to that prop-
erty vested in Tracy-Collins Trust Company as executor 
of the estate at Mr. Pierpont's death, where it remained 
vested until distributed to the bank as Trustee. 
III. THE RIGHTS AND POWERS OF TRACY-COLLINS 
TRUST COMPANY AS EXECUTOR OF THE PIER-
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PONT WILL ARE SEPARATE AND DISTINCT 
FROM THE RIGHTS AND POWERS IT HAS AS 
TRUSTEE. 
It is elementary and unquestioned law that one 
person can simultaneously act in several legal capacities 
and that the holding or exercise of rights and powers in 
one legal capacity does not constitute the holding or 
exercise of rights and powers in another simultaneously 
occupied legal capacity. So the rights and powers of 
Tracy-Collins Trust Company in its capacity as Executor 
are distinct from its rights and powers as Trustee. 
Despite this, Respondent, Pierpont, makes the un-
founded statement at page 12 of her brief that in Utah 
the "fiction of the separation between executor and 
trustee as to their powers and duties'' had been abolished, 
citing In re Lowe's Estate, 68 Utah 49, 249 Pac. 128, as 
authority. Counsel either did not fully read this decision 
or read it and did not understand what it held. The case 
did not involve a question of the exercise of any rights 
or powers by the executor or the trustee. Rather, it 
involved the question of ·whether a trust beneficiary 
could, during probate of the estate, exercise a power 
granted by the will to designate a substitute trustee. 
':rhe will provided that upon the exercise of that power 
the trustee designated in the will would be required "to 
transfer and conYey all of such property at the time in 
its hands and possession to such other trust company." 
The appellant trust company contended that this lan-
guage implied that the beneficiary could not exercise the 
power until the trust estate "Tas distributed to the trust 
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company as trustee. In rejecting this contention, the 
Supreme Court stated: 
''Such language merely shows, in our judgment, 
that it was her intention that whenever Mrs. 
Hampton in writing designated another trust 
company to act as trustee in place of the Bankers' 
Trust Company, then the latter should transfer 
and convey the title to and deliver possession, if 
it then had possession, of the trust estate to its 
successor in trust.'' 
The court then went on to point out that the title to the 
trust estate vested in the trusee at the moment of the 
testatrix's death and that the reason for this holding 
was that there was nothing in the will to overcome the 
statutory presumption that title vested in the trustee at 
the testatrix's death. Observe the language of the court 
which followed a reference to the statute which created 
a presumption that title vested at the testatrix's death: 
"There is nothing in the will to indicate an inten-
tion on the part of the testatrix that the vesting 
of the bequest and devises made therein should 
be postponed beyond her death.'' (Emphasis 
added.) 
At page 10 of her brief Respondent, Meyer, states 
in reference to In re Lowe's Esta.te, that reversal here 
can be made on no grounds other than a reversal of 
that decision. This statement is incorrect and ignores 
the fact that in will interpretation cases the results, which 
are dependent on the testator's intent, vary as will pro-
visions vary. A reversal here would, therefore, be en-
tirely consistent with In re Lowe's Estate if based upon 
the proper ground that the will provisions overcame the 
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statutory presumption. In fact, because of the explicit 
language providing for the vesting in the trustee of 
title to the residual estate at the time of distribution, an 
affirmance here would constitute a reversal of the prin-
ciple upheld in Lowe's Estate that a testator's expressed 
intention will overcome the presumption and control. 
IV. MR. PIERPONT'S INTENTION CANNOT BE 
ASCERTAINED FROM WHAT SOME OTHER TES-
TATOR PROVIDED. 
The pertinent provisions of the testator's will in In 
re Sears' Estate, 18 Utah 193, 55 Pac. 83 (cited by Re-
spondent, Pierpont, at page 19 of her brief and by Re-
spondent, Meyer, at pages 32, 36 and 44 of her brief) 
provided as follows : 
" 'First, I give, bequeath, and devise to my 
executors, hereinafter named, all the property, 
both real and personal, of which I may die pos-
sessed, after the payment of my debts and the 
expenses of administration, in trust for the fol-
lowing purposes : ( 1) To pay to my wife, Melissa 
Sears, during her life, such sums of money as my 
said trustees may, in their sound judgment and 
discretion, think reasonable and sufficient for her 
maintenance, having regard for her position and 
station in life; said sums to be paid monthly, be-
ginning at the date of my decease. ( 2) To pay 
to my sister, Maria Liddle, during her life, for 
the support of herself and her children living 
with her, the sum of fifty dollars each month, 
beginning with the date of my decease. (3) To 
pay to my nurse, :Mary .lL .Anderson, the sum of 
two hundred and fifty dollars, as soon as there 
shall be sufficient moneys in their hands; said two 
hundred and fifty dollars being intended by me as 
a gift to her for her faithful services during my 
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
late sickness and in addition to compensation for 
such services. ' ' ' 
After the payment of debts, expenses of administration 
and a monthly allowance to the widow during probate, 
which lasted about a year, only $617.87 remained in the 
estate. The issue was whether the sister, Maria Liddle, 
was entitlBd to payments under subparagraph (2), 
quoted above, in preference to payments provided for 
the nurse, Mary A. Anderson, under subparagraph (3). 
The trial court held that the nurse was entitled to pay-
ment in preference to the sister. The Supreme Court 
reversed, holding that the bequest to the sister was an 
annuity which commenced at the testator's death and 
was preferred over the bequest to the nurse. 
The Sears case did not involve a question as to the 
payments provided to be made to the wife and the state-
ments made by Respondent, Pierpont, at page 19 of her 
brief are erroneous. 
Because of the language of the will, the Sears' Estate 
decision was correct in holding that an annuity was 
created for the sister. First, the amount of the payments 
was definite ($50.00 per month) and the duty to make 
them was unqualified and unconditional. Also, the will 
expressly provided that the payments were to commence 
at the testator's death. These provisions removed any 
question about the testator having provided for a time 
of commencement of payment other than the date of 
death. 
It is apparent that the will involved in Sears' Estate 
is not even remotely similar to the pertinent provisions 
11 
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of the Pierpont will. Had the testator in Sears' Estate 
made the payments to the sister conditional and failed 
to provide that the payments were to commence at his 
death, as is true here, the holding would have been dif-
ferent. 
Obviously, In re Sears' Estate has no applicability 
and the citation of it by Respondents points to the 
futility of attempting to decide the meaning of the pro-
visions of one testator's will on the basis of what some 
other testator provided . .._t\..s was stated in In re Luckel's 
Estate cited by Respondent, Pierpont, at pages 14 and 
21 of her brief: 
''A will is to be construed according to the inten-
tion of the testator as expressed therein, and this 
intention must be given effect if possible. Each 
case depends on its own particular facts and 
precedents are of small value.'' 
V. RESPONDENTS HAVE FAILED TO INTERPRET 
THE vVILL AS A WHOLE. 
Although this appeal involves a question of will 
interpretation, neither of the Respondents has seriously 
attempted to analyze and interpret the various provi-
sions of Mr. Pierpont's will. Their briefs devote much 
space to cases interpreting the intention of other testa-
tors but little to interpreting \Yhat :Mr. Pierpont intended. 
In the instances when Respondents do make reference to 
the Pierpont will, it is usually to an isolated clause or 
sentence taken out of context and usually is made without 
comment as to what preceded or followed it. In effect, 
it seems that when Respondents do look at the will, it is 
done with blinders so as to exclude from view anything 
12 
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inconsistent with the narrow segment being read. The · 
following references to the Respondents' briefs demon-
strate this : 
1. In the last few lines of page 6 of her brief, Re-
spondent, Pierpont, states : 
"It is significant that paragraph 7 (i) instructs 
that the trustee shall make disbursements 'from 
the income of the trust estate and if insufficient. 
from the principal thereof' indicating the full 
extent to which the testator was willing to go to 
see that these monthly payments would be made.'' 
The brief neglects to mention that the above quoted 
provision is qualified by the language "subject to the 
provisions of subparagraph (k) of this paragraph 
SEVENTH.'' 
2. At the top of page 7 of Pierpont's brief it 1s 
stated in reference to subparagraph SEVENTH (k): 
"It provides that if income is insufficient and 
principal funds are not available that the trustee 
'may' reduce and if necessary 'may suspend' fur-
ther payments until funds become available 
through income or orderly sale of all or part of 
the principal assets, but in the event any pay-
ments specified to be made by trustee shall be so 
reduced or suspended, when funds become avail-
able, any so resulting deficiencies shall be made 
up.'' 
The brief fails to point out that the words "it is my 
desire" precede the provision "that when funds become 
available, any so resulting deficiencies in monthly pay-
ments shall be made up.'' 
3. Also at page 7 of her brief, Respondent, Pier-
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pont, refers to the words ''To make the payments speci-
fied hereunder'' as indicating the payments provided for 
under subparagraph SEVENTH ( i) were absolute and 
unconditional. This, however, ignores the fact that the 
payments which are ''specified'' or described there are 
expressly made subject to all the provisions of subpara-
graph SEVENTH (k). The respondent would like to 
interpret ''specified'' in its mandatory rather than its 
descriptive sense. However, when the word is examined 
in context, it is apparent that it cannot be so interpreted. 
4. At the top of page 20 of her brief Respondent, 
Pierpont, in referring to the provisions of subparagraph 
SEVENTH (k) regarding the making up of reduced or 
suspended payments, quotes the words ''shall be made 
up'' out of context without mentioning the qualifying, 
precatory language "It is my desire" contained in the 
same sentence. 
5. In paragraph 1 page 8 of her brief Respondent, 
Meyer, similarly fails to note the qualifying precatory 
language "it is my desire" and sees only the words 
"shall be made up." It is significant that in In re Pit-
tack's Will cited at page 33 of Appellants' brief, the 
provision interpreted by the court as not imposing a 
mandatory duty on the trustee was : 
"and it is my desire and I request that C. A. 
Morden shall be elected 'manager of the Oregonian 
and shall be retained as such, and that Edgar B. 
Piper shall be retained as managing editor of the 
Oregonian until he shall become incapacitated or 
until he may voluntarily resign.'' 
Consistent with established principles of will construe-
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tion, the precatory language was there held to confer 
discretion on the trustee, notwithstanding the repeated 
use of the word ''shall''. 
6. At the top of page 18 Respondent, Meyer, quotes 
the following portion of subparagraph (k) "any so re-
sulting deficiencies in monthly payments shall be made 
up" and ignores the qualifying precatory language "It 
is my desire. '' 
7. Again at page 35 of her brief Respondent, Meyer, 
looks only at the words "shall be made up." 
8. At pages 37 and 39 Respondent, Meyer, argues 
that the words "payments required to be made" in line 
2 of subparagraph SEVENTH (k) are to be interpreted 
as making the SEVENTH (i) payments absolute and 
unconditional. Again Respondent prefers to ignore the 
other provisions of the paragraph in the light of which 
the quoted words must be read. In addition Respondent 
loses sight of the fact that the word ''require'' has two 
meanings: one mandatory "to ask for authoritatively or 
imperatively, or as a right; to demand, claim, insist on 
having"; the other definition "to call for or demand as 
appropriate or suitable in the particular case; to need 
for some end or purpose.'' (Oxford Universal Dictionary 
1955 p. 1711) The "required" payments referred to in 
subparagraph SEVENTH (k) are, of course, the SEV-
ENTH (i) payments which are expressly made subject 
to all of the provisions of subparagraph SEVENTH (k). 
It is apparent that under these circumstances the word 
"required" was used in the sense of the second above 
mentioned definition. If the interpretation argued for 
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by Respondent, Meyer, were adopted it would necessarily 
follow that the SEVENTH (i) payments could be neither 
reduced or suspended as provided in SEVENTH (k), 
nor, in fact, could any of the provisions of SEVENTH 
(k) operate to limit or qualify the absolute requirement 
to pay the monthly sums. It would be difficult to think 
of a better example than this one to demonstrate the 
absurdity of attempting to interpret testamentary inten-
tion from an isolated phrase, wrested out of context. 
The evident reason for Respondents' failure to inter-
pret the will as a whole is that to do so leads to a result 
contrary to the one they have asserted on appeal. 
VI. THE PHRASE "DURING HER LIFETIME" USED 
IN PARAGRAPH SEVENTH (i) (1) and (2) HAS 
NO BEARING ON THE QUESTION OF WHEN THE 
PAYMENTS TO RESPONDENTS WERE TO COM-
MENCE. 
Both Respondents argue that the phrase "during 
her lifetime'' used in Paragraph SEVENTH (i) (1) 
and (2) express an intention that the respective pay-
ments were to commence at the Testator's death rather 
than at the time of distribution. No attempt is made in 
either answering brief to explain the reasoning processes 
by which this conclusion was reached, nor is any sup-
porting authority cited. 
Their contention is not based upon a literal interpre-
tation of the language, since literally, the words would 
mean from the time of the Respondents' births until their 
deaths. Neither Respondent, however, contends that 
Paragraph SEVENTH (i) pa~~ments extend beyond the 
t.i1ne of the Testator's death, "·hich can only mean, there-
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fore, that in their view the words have reference to a 
period commencing at some point in time after they were 
born and continuing thereafter during the remainder of 
their lives. They have arbitrarily, without reason or 
explanation, established that starting point as the date 
of the Testator's death. In answer, Appellants could, 
with equal arbitrariness and lack of reason, say that the 
starting point was the time of the distribution of the 
residual estate to the trustee. Neither argument stand-
ing alone has any force, however, and adds nothing to 
the attempt to get at the meaning of the Testator's will. 
It is obvious, therefore, that the words "during her life-
time" viewed alone have no bearing on the time when 
the payments to Respondents were to commence. 
VII. SECTION 74-3-12 U. C. A. 1953 IS INAPPLICABLE 
HERE. 
Section 74-3-12 U. C. A. 1953 referred to by Re-
spondent, Meyer, at pages 5 and 8 of her brief provides : 
"In case of a bequest of the interest or income of a 
certain sum or fund, the income accrues from the testa-
tor's death." This section is inapplicable here for two 
reasons. First, a trust consisting of an uncertain residual 
estate cannot be considered a ''certain'' sum or fund 
within the meaning of said §74-3-12. Second, §74-3-12 
is controlled by § 7 4-3-16 which provides ''The four pre-
ceding sections are in all cases to be controlled by a 
testator's express intention." Here the testator ex-
pressly provided that the residual estate would not vest 
in the trustee, and the trust would not be created until 
final distribution from the executor. There could be no 
income from the trust until after it came into being. 
17 
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Furthermore, during probate the property of the estate 
produced a total of only $244.75 in income (R. pp. 208-
213; 297-305). Therefore, any judgment in favor of 
Respondents based upon §74-3-12 would have to be lim-
ited to that amount. 
At page 8 of her brief Respondent, Meyer, argues, 
in reference to said §74-3-12, that if income, which may 
vary in amount, accrues from the Testator's death, 
monthly payments, payable from income or principal, 
clearly commence then. This argument is based upon the 
false assumptions (1) that §74-3-12 is applicable to resi-
dual trusts uncertain in character, and (2) that the trust 
came into being at Testator's death and the payments 
from the trust commenced then. In addition, it errone-
ously assumes that the payments are absolute and un-
conditional and unvarying in amount. In other words, 
that the payments are annuities. However, annuities are 
controlled by §74-3-14 and not §74-3-12. 
VIII. SECTION 74-3-14 U. C. A. 1953 IS INAPPLICABLE 
HERE. 
At pages 18 to 19 of her brief Respondent, Pierpont, 
argues that even assuming the payments provided to be 
made from subparagraph SEVENTH (i) are not annui-
ties, they are general legacies which, under §74-3-14 U. C. 
A. 1953 would be due and deliYerable one year after Tes-
tator's decease. This argument ignores the fact that under 
§74-3-16 the Testator's intention controls §74-3-14, which 
leads us once again to the basic inquiry as to when the 
Testator intended that the residual estate would vest in 
the Trustee and the time when the trust provisions of 
the will would become effertiYe. 
18 
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IX. THE CHECKS REFERRED TO BY RESPONDENT, 
MEYER, ARE NOT IN EVIDENCE AND REFER-
ENCE TO THEM IS IMPROPER. EVEN IF AD-
MITTED IN EVIDENCE, THEY WOULD HAVE 
NO BEARING ON THE ISSUES INVOLVED HERE. 
At pages 25 to 28 of her brief Respondent, Meyer, 
refers to certain checks from the Testator to Mrs. Meyer 
which were offered in evidence at the hearing in the 
lower court. The court refused to admit the checks in 
evidence, ruling that no extrinsic evidence was admis-
sible unless there was an ambiguity in the will. The 
court found that the will was clear and unambiguous. In 
answer to a question asked at the hearing, counsel for 
Mrs. Meyer conceded that the will was unambiguous. No 
assertion is made in the brief on appeal of Respondent, 
Meyer, that there is any ambiguity. It is, therefore, 
plain that not only are these checks not in evidence, but 
by counsel's own admission there is no basis on which 
they can be admitted in evidence. Notwithstanding this, 
the brief makes the unfounded and wholly inconsistent 
statement that : 
''This court is bound to accept the proffer of 
proof that for eighteen to twenty months before 
his death, he (testator) maintained her with pay-
ments of at least $100.00 per month.'' (Br. p. 41.) 
Obviously, no authority is cited to support this novel 
proposition. 
But even if the checks had been admitted in evidence, 
they would not support the argument which Respondent, 
Meyer, makes that the Testator had maintained her prior 
to his death. The fact that the Testator gave her money 
is not evidence that he maintained her. It is possible 
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that the checks were given in payment of an obligation 
or for some other unknown reason as to which this Court 
can only speculate. The checks are not dated in monthly 
sequence. Six of them are for $200.00 and one for $50.00. 
The first of said checks was dated December 15, 1951, 
some fourteen months prior to the execution of the will 
and thirty-three months prior to the Testator's death. 
It is apparent, therefore, that the checks would be mean-
ingless even if in evidence unless the Court intended to 
engage in speculation. 
In asserting that the payments to Mrs. Meyer are 
for her maintenance, counsel apparently has in mind 
§74-3-15 U. C. A. 1953 which provides, in part, that lega-
cies for maintenance "bear interest from a testator's 
decease.'' If this is the contention, it has no merit. The 
provisions of said §74-3-15 U. C. A. 1953 are controlled 
by §74-3-16 which provides that "the four preceding sec-
tions are in all cases to be controlled by a testator's ex-
press intention.'' Here the Testator did not grant a 
specific legacy of a certain amount of money to Respon-
dent, Meyer, but rather devised and bequeathed the 
residue of his estate to the Appellant bank as Trustee and 
provided for the conditional payment to the Respondent 
of certain amounts from the trust. It was expressly pro-
vided that the trust ·would not come into existence and 
the title to the trust property would not Yest in the 
Trustee until the final distribution of the estate from the 
Executor. Any payments provided to be made from the 
trust rould not, therefore, commence or accrue until then. 
It is signifkant that the Testator expressly pro-
Yi<h'd for pa~,nwnts to his ·widow during probate under 
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Paragraph SIXTH of the will. If the Testator had in-
tended that Mrs. Meyer receive payments during the 
period of probate, he would have so expressly provided 
as he did in the case of his widow. 
In any event, this desperate attempt by Respondents' 
counsel to find another basis to support the lower court's 
decree is not timely made and cannot be asserted at this 
late date. 
X. HOLDING IN CASE CITED BY RESPONDENT, 
PIERPONT, IS CONTRARY TO PRINCIPLE FOR 
WHICH CASE CITED. 
At pages 11 to 12 of her brief Respondent, Pierpont, 
makes the following statement : 
"When resort is had to a written instrument 
alone, the interpretation of the trial court, if 
reasonable, will be accepted by the appellate 
court, or if that interpretation is one of two 
reasonable views, it will be followed.'' 
In support of this statement, the brief cites In re Platt's 
Estate, 21 Cal. 2d 343, 131 P. 2d 825. Actually, the Re-
spondent has cited the Platt case for a proposition which 
was asserted on appeal by the respondent, but which was 
rejected by the California Supreme Court. It was there 
urged that since the judgment of the lower court was 
"based upon a reasonable construction of the provisions 
of the will concerning the right to income * * * this court 
may not substitute another interpretation for it." In 
rejecting this contention and in reversing the trial court, 
the Supreme Court stated: 
''An appellate court is not bound by a construc-
tion of the contract based solely upon the terms 
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of the written instrument without the aid of evi-
dence (citing authorities) where there is no con-
flict in the evidence (citing authorities) or a 
determination has been made upon competent 
evidence (citing authorities). Under these cir-
cumstances, there is no issue of fact and it is the 
duty of an appellate court to make the final de-
termination in accordance with the applicable 
principles of law.'' 
We also call the Court's attention to the following 
statement from In re Luckel's Estate, 151 Cal. App. 2d 
481, 312 P. 2d 24, 31, cited by Respondent, Pierpont, at 
pages 14 and 21 of her brief : 
"The probate court's construction of the will was 
based solely on its terms without the aid of evi-
dence. Accordingly, it is the duty of this court 
to construe it.'' 
XI. RESPONDENTS' FAILURE TO CITE CONTRARY 
AUTHORITIES OR TO SHOW THAT TESTATOR 
INTENDED A CONTRARY RESULT CONFIRMS 
APPELLANTS' ARGUMENT THAT THE PAY-
MENTS UNDER PARAGRAPH SEVENTH (i) ARE 
NOT ANNUITIES. 
Because of the express will language providing that 
the residual estate would vest in the Trustee and the 
trust would come into being only after probate was com-
pleted and the residual estate distributed to the Trustee, 
and because of the language of subparagraph SEVENTH 
( i) providing for payments to the Respondents ''from 
the income of the trust estate and if insufficient, from 
the principal thereof", which clearly show that the sub-
paragraph SEVENTH (i) payments were to commence 
at the time of distribution to the Trustee, Respondents 
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can prevail here, if at all, only if said subparagraph 
SEVENTH (i) payments are annuities within the mean-
ing of §74-3-12 U. C. A. 1953. * 
Neither of Respondents cites authority nor points 
to any will provisions which contradict Appellants' ar-
guments at pages 25 to 37 of their brief to the effect 
that the said subparagraph SEVENTH (i) payments 
are not annuities. Respondent, Pierpont, attempts to 
dispose of the subject merely by deploring Appellants' 
reference to the definition of an annuity contained in 
§31-11-2 U. C. A. 1953, by citing In re Sears' Estate, 18 
Utah 193, 55 Pac. 83, (in which case testator's will ex-
pressly provided that payments were to commence at 
his death); and by quoting fragmentary statements from 
Black's Law Dictionary and Corpus Juris Secundum 
which relate to the effect of an annuity, assuming that 
one exists, rather than to the elements essential to the 
existence of an annuity. 
Respondent, Meyer's treatment of the annuity ques-
tion at pages 31 to 40 of her brief is equally superficial. 
She does argue, in addition, that payments "in the 
nature of an annuity" are controlled by said §74-3-12, 
thus evidencing the same uncertainty as the trial court 
of whether these payments are, in fact, annuities. It is 
clear, however, that only payments which meet the 
annuity test are governed by the statute. 
Although Appellants are aware of no principle of 
statutory construction which limits the annuity definition 
*"In case of a bequest of the interest or income of a certain sum or 
fund, the income accrues from the testator's death." 
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in §31-11-2 to insurance contracts, they will, in order to 
forestall argument and complaint by Respondents, ignore 
it and confine their analysis to the annuity definition in 
§74-3-1 U. C. A., 1953 and the generally accepted annuity 
definition developed in the cases set out at page 27 of 
Appellants' brief. In addition to the authorities and 
definitions set out there, Appellants call attention to the 
following definition of an annuity contained in In re 
Luckel's Estate, 151 Cal. 2d 481, 312 P. 2d 24, cited by 
Respondent, Pierpont, at pages 14 and 21 of her brief: 
''An annuity is a periodical payment which is 
payable unconditionally, there being no contin-
gency present.'' 
In this connection, we note that the California statutory 
annuity definition is identical to the one in §74-3-1 U. 
C. A. 1953. 
The test, then, in determining if the subparagraph 
SEVENTH (i) payments are annuities is whether or not 
they are payable unconditionally and without contin-
gency. The answer to this inquiry must be determined 
from the language of the will viewed from the time when 
the Testator executed the will and in light of the circum-
stances under which it was executed. Interpreted in this 
manner and as of that time, there is no doubt that these 
payments are not annuities. In the first place, the pay-
ments to Mrs. Pierpont are expressly conditioned upon 
the continuance of her u1unarried status. In the second 
plnre, the payments to both Respondents are expressly 
subject to and conditioned by the provisions of sub-
pnrngraph SEVENTH (k), under which the Trustee has 
tlH' power to reduce or suspend the payments under 
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certain prescribed circumstances. Said subparagraph 
SEVENTH (k) also confers discretionary power upon 
the Trustee to make up or not to make up suspended or 
reduced payments when the reasons for the reduction 
or suspension have ceased to exist. It is respectfully 
submitted that under these circumstances these payments 
cannot reasonably be interpreted to be annuities. 
Furthermore, even if they are annuities, the pay-
ments must date from the time of distribution, not from 
the date of the Testator's death, because the provisions 
of ~74-3-12 are controlled by the Testator's intention as 
provided in ~74-3-16. Here the Testator expressly pro-
vided that the trust estate would not vest in the Trustee 
and the trust provision would not become effective until 
final distribution of the estate. Under these circum-
stances, the subparagraph SEVENTH (i) payments 
provided to be made ''from the income of the trust 
estate, and, if insufficient, from the principal thereof", 
logically could date only from the time the trust estate 
came into existence. Also, since there was no income 
from date of death until August 29, 1957 (except $244.75) 
all payments between those dates must be regarded as 
suspended payments under subparagraph SEVENTH 
(k) and the question of whether or not such suspended 
payments are to made up lies within the discretion of 
the Trustee. 
In connection with the last mentioned point, Re-
spondents fail to distinguish between the effect of said 
subparagraph SEVENTH (k) as it relates to : (a) the 
issue of whether subparagraph SEVENTH (i) payments 
are annuities and (b) the issue of whether, assuming the 
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SEVENTH (i) payments are annuities, the Trustee 
nevertheless has the discretion to make · up suspended 
payments for the period between the date of. death and 
August 29, 1957. As to the first issue, said provision 
must be viewed as of the date of execution of the will. 
~s to the second issue, it must be viewed as of the time 
when liquid assets are available after payments have 
been reduced or suspended. Of course, if said payments 
are held not to be annuities and that they did not com-
mence until distribution of theresidual estate to the 
Trustee, the second issue does not exist here. The failure 
of Respondents to distinguish between these essentially 
different concepts has resulted in a good deal of confusion 
in their briefs. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion Appellants desire to emphasize that 
the fundamental issue in this case is : when did the 
Testator intend that the subparagraph SEVENTH (i) 
payments would commence~ This issue can be deter-
mined only from Mr. Pierpont's will. An essential ele-
ment in deciding this ultimate question is the time when 
the residual trust estate vested in the Trustee and the 
time when the trust provisions became effective. Here 
again the question can be answered only from an inter-
pretation of the will. To support its contentions that 
the will clearly provides that title to the trust property 
was intended to vest only after probate was completed; 
that the trust provisions were not intended to become 
effective until that time and that the payments did not 
commence until then, Appellants have heretofore re-
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ferred the Court and, again, respectfully refer the Court 
to the three following features of the will. 
FIRST, the period during which the family allow-
ance was to be paid under paragraph SIXTH was de-
fined by the Testator as being ''from the date of my 
death until such time as my residual estate shall be dis-
tributed to my Trustee, as provided in paragraph 
SEVENTH.'' The pertinent provisions of paragraph 
SEVENTH which immediately follow this quotation are: 
''I give, devise and bequeath all the rest, residue 
and remainder of my estate, real, personal or 
mixed, wheresoever situate, whereof I may be 
seized or possessed, or to which I ·may in any 
manner be entitled, or in which I may be inter-
ested at the time of my death, to TRACY-COL-
- LINS TRUST COMPANY, of Salt Lake City, 
Utah, as Trustee, in trust, nevertheless, for the 
following uses and purposes :'' 
It is apparent from the use of the words "give, devise 
and bequeath" in said paragraph SEVENTH that it is 
under this paragraph that the Trustee must derive its 
title to the residual estate. It is equally clear, in view 
of the express language of paragraph SIXTH, that said 
paragraph SEVENTH was not to become operative 
until after probate had been completed, so that the dis-
tribution of the residual estate to the Trustee and the 
vesting of title to the residual estate in the Trustee 
would occur simultaneously. 
The accuracy of this interpretation is demonstrated 
by noting the illogical result that follows under para-
graph SIXTH if the Lower Court's interpretation is 
adopted. The Lower Court held that the provisions of 
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paragraph. SEVENTH became effective and that title 
to the residual estate vested in the Trustee at the Testa-
tor's death. Under this view, note that paragraph 
SIXTH provides no period during which the family 
allowance is to be paid, because the time of commence-
ment (the Testator's death) is identical with the time 
of termination (time of distribution as provided by 
paragraph SEVENTH which the Lower Court held 
occurred at death). 
SECOND, in every will provision in which the Tes-
ator granted any of his esate, except paragraph SEV-
ENTH, the Testaor used the language ''I hereby give 
and bequeath ... " In paragraph SEVENTH, however, 
the word "hereby" was significantly eliminated, indi-
cating clearly that as to all the grants except as to the 
residual estate, title was to pass under the will at the 
time of Testator's death. 
THIRD, the numerous other will provisions referred 
to and analyzed in Appellants' brief, show that Testator 
clearly intended that there would be successive and not 
simultaneous periods of probate and trust administra-
tion. 
Since it is apparent that Testator intended that title 
to the trust estate would Yest and the trust provisions 
would become effectin~ at the time of distribution of the 
residual estate to the Trustee, the provisions in sub-
paragraph SEVENTH (i) that the payments were to 
be made ''from the income of the trust estate and, if 
insufficient, from the principal thereof'' could not logic-
nll)r have reference to a time prior to the time the trust 
came into being. 
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This interpretation is corroborated by the fact that 
under paragraph SIXTH the Testator provided for a 
payment to the widow of a $250.00 per month family 
allowance from the date of his death to the time of 
distribution, as provided in paragraph SEVENTH, and 
then provided under paragraph SEVENTH for the pay-
ment to her of $250.00 per month during her lifetime or 
until she remarried, subject to the conditions of sub-
paragraph SEVENTH (k). This discloses a clear testa-
mentary intention that the widow receive only the sum 
of $250.00 per month from the date of Testator's death 
subject to the applicable will provisions. The decision 
of the Trial Court upsets this testamentary intention and 
results in the payment to the widow of the sum of $500.00 
per month during probate and $250.00 per month there-
after. 
It is respectfully submitted that this interpretation 
is at variance with the will and that the judgment of the 
Lower Court should therefore be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SENIOR & SENIOR 
FRANCIS M. GIBBONS 
Attorneys for Appellants 
29 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
